12.07.2011
8.16.2011
5.14.2011
crises
By Jennifer G. Cooke
Dec 7, 2010
Côte d’Ivoire remains locked in a precarious political standoff, with incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo refusing to cede office to political rival Alassane Ouattara, despite preponderant evidence that the latter won the November 28 presidential runoff election. After the Independent Electoral Commission announced a 54 to 46 percent outcome in favor of Ouattara, the country’s Constitutional Council, at the behest of Gbagbo, overruled the commission, annulling results in nine northern precincts and giving Gbagbo a 51 to 49 percent victory. Both men have subsequently sworn themselves in as president in separate ceremonies, and each has begun to appoint cabinet members.
Gbagbo’s postelection power play has been neither subtle nor sophisticated. He summarily dismissed the findings of the Ivoirian electoral commission, which as incumbent, he was responsible in establishing. When his initial bid to the Constitutional Council to annul results in four northern precincts on the basis of fraud proved insufficient to tip the balance in his favor, he added five more to the list.
Gbagbo has incurred the near universal condemnation and censure of the regional and international community. Western leaders, including U.S. president Barack Obama and French president Nicolas Sarkozy have congratulated Alassane Ouattara on his victory. The European Union has announced the possibility of targeted sanctions against individuals who obstruct the electoral process, and the World Bank has warned that continued intransigence will put development assistance flows at serious risk. UN secretary-general Ban Ki-Moon has recognized and endorsed the electoral commission’s announcement of Ouattara’s victory. China has said that it will respect the sovereignty of the Ivoirian government but will back efforts of the African Union to mediate. The African Union, for its part, quickly dispatched former South African president Thabo Mbeki to Abidjan to try to break the standoff. Mbeki left two days later, unsuccessful, urging that “every effort should be made to ensure that the transition to democracy succeeds.” Subsequently, the African Union went further, issuing a statement that calls for “respect for the outcome of the presidential election as proclaimed by the Independent Electoral Commission.” West African leaders, joined by Mbeki, have convened an emergency meeting of the regional grouping ECOWAS to determine a way forward. ECOWAS too has endorsed the findings of the electoral commission and called for Gbagbo to resign.
Some 20 people have been killed in postelection violence, according to Amnesty International. Four were killed when government security forces raided Ouattara’s party offices in Abidjan on December 1. The Liberian government reports an influx of Ivoirians crossing the border, seeking refuge from a possible resurgence in violence.
Q1: What is Gbagbo thinking?
A1: In the first instance, Gbagbo may have been taken by surprise by the opposition’s victory, underestimating the level of resentment among Ivoirians against his extended stay in office and failing to anticipate the heavy swing by supporters of Henri Konan Bedié, a contender in the first round of elections whose base lies in the country’s south and central regions, to back the “northern” candidate Ouattara in the runoff. The ham-handedness of Gbagbo’s reversal of the results suggests that he may not have felt the need for more subtle forms of manipulation in the run-up to the election. He may too have counted on the African Union’s traditional predilection to support the status quo and its unwillingness to speak out too forcefully against incumbent leaders or electoral malfeasance.
Now, with regional and international censure mounting against him, Gbagbo most likely calculates that by maintaining an unapologetic vice grip on the incumbency he will force a negotiated power-sharing arrangement that will leave him, if not fully in control, at least at the table and in a position to continue to exert and expand his own influence and that of his allies in government. In this he can draw inspiration from Zimbabwe in 2008 and Kenya in 2007, where the international community, lacking adequate leverage and fearing mounting levels of civil unrest and violence, abandoned aspirations for democratic transition and settled instead for government by negotiation. In fact, the Ivoirian government itself has been since 2003 an ostensible coalition government, facilitated first by France and then by Burkina Faso president Blaise Campaoré who sought to avert a continuing crisis.
Gbagbo may reckon that mounting levels of violence will play to his favor, since international aversion to civil war may in the end trump democratic considerations and force a compromise solution that ultimately disenfranchises the majority of Ivoirians. For Ouattara supporters, violence will be a double-edged sword: on the one hand, it may play to Gbagbo’s hand; on the other, they may see it as the only way to galvanize international intervention as Gbagbo seeks to entrench his position in the presidential palace.
Q2: Is a return to civil war possible?
A2: Gbagbo has taken a dangerous gamble. In the current context, a return to civil war in Côte d’Ivoire is a very real risk, with a strong possibility that conflict will be far more violent and costly than in 2002–2003. The crisis in Côte d’Ivoire never fully degenerated into the all-out violence that wracked neighboring Sierra Leone or Liberia. It was instead largely frozen in a situation of “neither peace nor war” maintained by a UN peacekeeping operation deployment (UNOCI) of some 8,000 troops and a buffer zone between north and south maintained by UNOCI and a deployment of French soldiers (5,300 at its height) under Operation Licorne. Ten years ago, most Ivoirians were shocked and saddened that the country, which had once been touted as an “oasis of stability” in a continent wracked by war and military coups, could disintegrate in political violence and fracture so badly along ethnic and regional lines. Since then, however, Ivoirians have become more battle hardened and cynical, with divisions within the country increasingly polarized, exacerbated by Gbagbo’s repeated election delays, the utter failure of national leadership and reconciliation, and continuing inflow of arms to all sides despite a UN arms embargo and efforts at disarmament. The country’s military forces are only nominally integrated, and a proliferation of militias in north and south raise the possibility of localized violence that may escalate. General Philippe Mangou, head of the national armed forces, has sworn his allegiance to President Gbagbo; leaders of the former rebel group Forces Nouvelles have declared their willingness to fight if Ouattara gives the word.
Q3: What role is there for the international community?
A3: Côte d’Ivoire’s current crisis is a significant and fundamental test of the resolve, leverage, and integrity of the African Union (AU). It is also an opportunity for the organization to exert global leadership—by drawing China, Russia, and other reluctant states into an international consensus position—and to live up more fully to the principles on which the organization was founded. The AU must do all it can to press for Gbagbo’s resignation and resist internal pressures to go for a power-sharing deal. The violation of democratic process and principle in the current crisis has been too flagrant: not only will negotiations with Gbagbo fundamentally undermine the AU’s credibility for future mediation efforts, but a political compromise is unlikely to buy time, peace, or acceptance from the Ivoirian people. Gbagbo has sent emissaries to neighboring African states, almost certainly seeking to plead his case and sow the seeds for possible divisions within ECOWAS and the AU. Gbagbo knows that there are any number of African leaders who are reluctant to question the legitimacy of an incumbent president or question a flawed electoral process.
ECOWAS and the AU should press upon Gbagbo that he faces increasing isolation and that the country risks suspension from both organizations. The United States and broader international community should seek to support and amplify the voice of the AU and West African leadership in pressing Gbagbo to respect the findings of the electoral commission. The United States should join with the European Union to up the pressure on Gbagbo and cohorts with the possibility of targeted sanctions and further isolation and should impress upon AU and ECOWAS the importance of this moment for the two organizations’ global leadership and credibility.
A return to conflict in Côte d’Ivoire could have devastating regional consequences, with the possibility of destabilizing outflows of refugees and economic impacts on neighboring countries that rely on the country for goods, jobs, and access to the port in Abidjan. Côte d’Ivoire was a critical piece in the regional “conflict system” that engulfed Liberia and Sierra Leone from the mid-1990s, with arms, young men, and proxy militias moving fluidly across borders, and instability in one metastasizing to broader regional insecurity. Both Sierra Leone and Liberia remain vulnerable, despite major international investments in UN peacekeeping missions and development assistance, and neighboring Guinea narrowly escaped a violent postelection meltdown just two months ago. Russia has reportedly objected to the UN Security Council weighing in on election results in a sovereign country. Ivoirians, African leadership, and the broader international community must make the case that Gbagbo’s continued intransigence and flouting of institutions that he himself helped create represent a very real threat to regional peace and security.
Jennifer G. Cooke is director of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
Critical Questions is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).
© 2010 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
Programs
Africa Program, Africa Program Current Highlights, The Crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, African Elections
Topics
Defense and Security, International Security, Human Rights, Governance
Regions
Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa
Dec 7, 2010
Côte d’Ivoire remains locked in a precarious political standoff, with incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo refusing to cede office to political rival Alassane Ouattara, despite preponderant evidence that the latter won the November 28 presidential runoff election. After the Independent Electoral Commission announced a 54 to 46 percent outcome in favor of Ouattara, the country’s Constitutional Council, at the behest of Gbagbo, overruled the commission, annulling results in nine northern precincts and giving Gbagbo a 51 to 49 percent victory. Both men have subsequently sworn themselves in as president in separate ceremonies, and each has begun to appoint cabinet members.
Gbagbo’s postelection power play has been neither subtle nor sophisticated. He summarily dismissed the findings of the Ivoirian electoral commission, which as incumbent, he was responsible in establishing. When his initial bid to the Constitutional Council to annul results in four northern precincts on the basis of fraud proved insufficient to tip the balance in his favor, he added five more to the list.
Gbagbo has incurred the near universal condemnation and censure of the regional and international community. Western leaders, including U.S. president Barack Obama and French president Nicolas Sarkozy have congratulated Alassane Ouattara on his victory. The European Union has announced the possibility of targeted sanctions against individuals who obstruct the electoral process, and the World Bank has warned that continued intransigence will put development assistance flows at serious risk. UN secretary-general Ban Ki-Moon has recognized and endorsed the electoral commission’s announcement of Ouattara’s victory. China has said that it will respect the sovereignty of the Ivoirian government but will back efforts of the African Union to mediate. The African Union, for its part, quickly dispatched former South African president Thabo Mbeki to Abidjan to try to break the standoff. Mbeki left two days later, unsuccessful, urging that “every effort should be made to ensure that the transition to democracy succeeds.” Subsequently, the African Union went further, issuing a statement that calls for “respect for the outcome of the presidential election as proclaimed by the Independent Electoral Commission.” West African leaders, joined by Mbeki, have convened an emergency meeting of the regional grouping ECOWAS to determine a way forward. ECOWAS too has endorsed the findings of the electoral commission and called for Gbagbo to resign.
Some 20 people have been killed in postelection violence, according to Amnesty International. Four were killed when government security forces raided Ouattara’s party offices in Abidjan on December 1. The Liberian government reports an influx of Ivoirians crossing the border, seeking refuge from a possible resurgence in violence.
Q1: What is Gbagbo thinking?
A1: In the first instance, Gbagbo may have been taken by surprise by the opposition’s victory, underestimating the level of resentment among Ivoirians against his extended stay in office and failing to anticipate the heavy swing by supporters of Henri Konan Bedié, a contender in the first round of elections whose base lies in the country’s south and central regions, to back the “northern” candidate Ouattara in the runoff. The ham-handedness of Gbagbo’s reversal of the results suggests that he may not have felt the need for more subtle forms of manipulation in the run-up to the election. He may too have counted on the African Union’s traditional predilection to support the status quo and its unwillingness to speak out too forcefully against incumbent leaders or electoral malfeasance.
Now, with regional and international censure mounting against him, Gbagbo most likely calculates that by maintaining an unapologetic vice grip on the incumbency he will force a negotiated power-sharing arrangement that will leave him, if not fully in control, at least at the table and in a position to continue to exert and expand his own influence and that of his allies in government. In this he can draw inspiration from Zimbabwe in 2008 and Kenya in 2007, where the international community, lacking adequate leverage and fearing mounting levels of civil unrest and violence, abandoned aspirations for democratic transition and settled instead for government by negotiation. In fact, the Ivoirian government itself has been since 2003 an ostensible coalition government, facilitated first by France and then by Burkina Faso president Blaise Campaoré who sought to avert a continuing crisis.
Gbagbo may reckon that mounting levels of violence will play to his favor, since international aversion to civil war may in the end trump democratic considerations and force a compromise solution that ultimately disenfranchises the majority of Ivoirians. For Ouattara supporters, violence will be a double-edged sword: on the one hand, it may play to Gbagbo’s hand; on the other, they may see it as the only way to galvanize international intervention as Gbagbo seeks to entrench his position in the presidential palace.
Q2: Is a return to civil war possible?
A2: Gbagbo has taken a dangerous gamble. In the current context, a return to civil war in Côte d’Ivoire is a very real risk, with a strong possibility that conflict will be far more violent and costly than in 2002–2003. The crisis in Côte d’Ivoire never fully degenerated into the all-out violence that wracked neighboring Sierra Leone or Liberia. It was instead largely frozen in a situation of “neither peace nor war” maintained by a UN peacekeeping operation deployment (UNOCI) of some 8,000 troops and a buffer zone between north and south maintained by UNOCI and a deployment of French soldiers (5,300 at its height) under Operation Licorne. Ten years ago, most Ivoirians were shocked and saddened that the country, which had once been touted as an “oasis of stability” in a continent wracked by war and military coups, could disintegrate in political violence and fracture so badly along ethnic and regional lines. Since then, however, Ivoirians have become more battle hardened and cynical, with divisions within the country increasingly polarized, exacerbated by Gbagbo’s repeated election delays, the utter failure of national leadership and reconciliation, and continuing inflow of arms to all sides despite a UN arms embargo and efforts at disarmament. The country’s military forces are only nominally integrated, and a proliferation of militias in north and south raise the possibility of localized violence that may escalate. General Philippe Mangou, head of the national armed forces, has sworn his allegiance to President Gbagbo; leaders of the former rebel group Forces Nouvelles have declared their willingness to fight if Ouattara gives the word.
Q3: What role is there for the international community?
A3: Côte d’Ivoire’s current crisis is a significant and fundamental test of the resolve, leverage, and integrity of the African Union (AU). It is also an opportunity for the organization to exert global leadership—by drawing China, Russia, and other reluctant states into an international consensus position—and to live up more fully to the principles on which the organization was founded. The AU must do all it can to press for Gbagbo’s resignation and resist internal pressures to go for a power-sharing deal. The violation of democratic process and principle in the current crisis has been too flagrant: not only will negotiations with Gbagbo fundamentally undermine the AU’s credibility for future mediation efforts, but a political compromise is unlikely to buy time, peace, or acceptance from the Ivoirian people. Gbagbo has sent emissaries to neighboring African states, almost certainly seeking to plead his case and sow the seeds for possible divisions within ECOWAS and the AU. Gbagbo knows that there are any number of African leaders who are reluctant to question the legitimacy of an incumbent president or question a flawed electoral process.
ECOWAS and the AU should press upon Gbagbo that he faces increasing isolation and that the country risks suspension from both organizations. The United States and broader international community should seek to support and amplify the voice of the AU and West African leadership in pressing Gbagbo to respect the findings of the electoral commission. The United States should join with the European Union to up the pressure on Gbagbo and cohorts with the possibility of targeted sanctions and further isolation and should impress upon AU and ECOWAS the importance of this moment for the two organizations’ global leadership and credibility.
A return to conflict in Côte d’Ivoire could have devastating regional consequences, with the possibility of destabilizing outflows of refugees and economic impacts on neighboring countries that rely on the country for goods, jobs, and access to the port in Abidjan. Côte d’Ivoire was a critical piece in the regional “conflict system” that engulfed Liberia and Sierra Leone from the mid-1990s, with arms, young men, and proxy militias moving fluidly across borders, and instability in one metastasizing to broader regional insecurity. Both Sierra Leone and Liberia remain vulnerable, despite major international investments in UN peacekeeping missions and development assistance, and neighboring Guinea narrowly escaped a violent postelection meltdown just two months ago. Russia has reportedly objected to the UN Security Council weighing in on election results in a sovereign country. Ivoirians, African leadership, and the broader international community must make the case that Gbagbo’s continued intransigence and flouting of institutions that he himself helped create represent a very real threat to regional peace and security.
Jennifer G. Cooke is director of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
Critical Questions is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).
© 2010 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
Programs
Africa Program, Africa Program Current Highlights, The Crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, African Elections
Topics
Defense and Security, International Security, Human Rights, Governance
Regions
Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa
6.28.2010
5.06.2010
1.02.2010
UNILAG NIGHT LIFE
Hi, my nick name is chief humanbeing,a student of UNILAG. Join me as I take you round UNILAG to give you a first hand information about a typical night inside our ALMIGHTY UNILAG; nights that are always pregnant.
A typical UNILAG night starts from 7pm after most students must have returned back to their hostels.Right from the main gate of the university,you start seeing different kinds of cars trooping in tom line up for the night;s BIG catch. In order to enjoy our discussion, am going to divide a typical UNILAG night int three categories viz: click here to read more
A typical UNILAG night starts from 7pm after most students must have returned back to their hostels.Right from the main gate of the university,you start seeing different kinds of cars trooping in tom line up for the night;s BIG catch. In order to enjoy our discussion, am going to divide a typical UNILAG night int three categories viz: click here to read more
BIG BOYS
When we published our maiden edition of this news letter last year April, we gave our own definition of who a bigs boy is and how he can be easily recognised. ]
Below is a third party opinion about who is really a bigs boy as submitted by an anonymous contributor.
By UNILAG standards, the following are the conditions that are necessary and sufficient to qualify a guy as a bigs boy,failure to meet all the conditions renders na guy as a potential bigs boy.
DRESSING: The total swag of a bigs boy at any point in time should not be less than N35,000 and must be able to boast of an expensive wrist watch that is not more than six months old, a brand new phone that is not less than N30,000 and not more than four months ols.
A bigs boy must have a car with a fully functional air condition, the car which must be relatively new and must be in good condition.
In UNILAG, a bigs boy does not have any business staying in the hostel, he must be rich enough to rent an apartment,furnish it to taste and must not have more than one other occupant.
A bigs boy has a bigs girl to always keep his company and must also be connected with the movers and shakers on campus. In short he must be influential.
A bigs boy is big enough to attend expensive and important shows within and outside the campus preferably always with the VIP ticket.
A bigs boy believe in the survival of the fittest and therefore he must not be easily intimidated by others boys. In short he must always remain relevant on campus.
Above all, a bigs boy does not need introduction inorder to be identified as a bigs boy. In short, at first sight, the picture of him that readily comes to mind is that "A BIGS BOY HAS ARRIVED" Needless to say, a bigs boy must be absolutely handsome and must always have some cash to dispense at any time T.
send us your comments,reactions, opinions or even your own definition of a bigs boy or a bigs girl, we will be glad to hear from you and even publish it for others to read. Reach us on unilagpalava@gmail.com
1.01.2010
THE LAGOON FRONT
The lagoon front is a serene environment located at the tail end of UNILAG and very close to the botanical garden. The lagoon front is an area that is being consciously developed by the authorities of UNILAG, It's an area intended to be a relaxation centre for students and the entire academic community.
The lagoon front has a lot of collections to its credit ranging from crabs, old(rare) trees, seats in different categories for lovers,conference seats, lone seats, botanical garden that houses backyard animals and some rare animals like crocodile. A visit to the site will also afford you the opportunity of looking at the traffic behaviour on third mainland bridge during rush hours,the local fisher men with their old tools of catching fishes plus the systematic movement of the ocean current.A visit to the lagoon front can make a whole lot of difference if you are looking for a relaxation spot where you can ease up your stress.
to react to this write up, just double click the title of this write up and a clomment page will come up.
Students of UNILAG always find a way of sharing their love life with their love ones within the premises of UNILAG. This is evident in the number of official and unofficial love venues called love love gardens that exist within UNILAG.
IN our new series, we xtray the locations of such love gardens and the kind of activities that goes on there: this week, we shall look at
SENATE LOVE GARDEN AND EDUCATION LOVE GARDEN
EDUCATION LOVE GARDEN:
This unique love garden is located within the premises of the faculty of Education and it is surrounded by four students hostel namely: QUEEN AMINAT HOSTEL, KOFO HOSTEL, GREAT HELKANEMI AND THE NUTORIOUS BIOBAKU HOSTEL.
BecAUSE OF THE NUMBER OF HOSTELS AROUND this love garden, activities within the garden is always at top gear as the garden begin to wear the look of a zoo for humanbeing. Boys and girls always converge on this venue to discuss issues of love as it affects their lives and their future. some side attractions in the garden include kissing and hot romance which sometimes run to the hour of 12am,the average number of students that visit this venue ranges from sixty to seventy students as the late comers may have to stand especially where the venue has been completely filled up.
Some students are of the opinion that the education love garden is for those that cant afford mini bite, mr biggs and the e=-zone or those that want to reduce their cost of hosting a babe in an eatery facility. EDUCATION LOVE GARDEN IS THE PLACE TO BE if you want to use the night as a cover for one on one hot romance.
SENATE LOVE GARDEN
This garden is located right within the premises of the Senate building of UNILAG and it is in the open unlike the education love garden. This place is very close to te lagoon front and as a result in the night, the atmosphere around the area is very cold. students dont normally fill this place when compared with the volume of trafic in education love garden, one major factor responsible for this is that the senate love garden is in the open which as a result dont allow for the kind of shows that is characterized with the education love garden. the kind of people that visit this area are those that have decided to take a walk up schoola nd as a result felt tired so they may decide to rest at the senate love garden, another factor is that the senate love garden always look like a gost arena in the night because students are afraid of the night therefore chosing to go to the education love garden instead.
Whether education love garden or senate love garden, everything that goes on around that area is strictly UNCENSORED.
COMPILED BY:
Tatafo
for unilag palava
SENATE LOVE GARDEN AND EDUCATION LOVE GARDEN
EDUCATION LOVE GARDEN:
This unique love garden is located within the premises of the faculty of Education and it is surrounded by four students hostel namely: QUEEN AMINAT HOSTEL, KOFO HOSTEL, GREAT HELKANEMI AND THE NUTORIOUS BIOBAKU HOSTEL.
BecAUSE OF THE NUMBER OF HOSTELS AROUND this love garden, activities within the garden is always at top gear as the garden begin to wear the look of a zoo for humanbeing. Boys and girls always converge on this venue to discuss issues of love as it affects their lives and their future. some side attractions in the garden include kissing and hot romance which sometimes run to the hour of 12am,the average number of students that visit this venue ranges from sixty to seventy students as the late comers may have to stand especially where the venue has been completely filled up.
Some students are of the opinion that the education love garden is for those that cant afford mini bite, mr biggs and the e=-zone or those that want to reduce their cost of hosting a babe in an eatery facility. EDUCATION LOVE GARDEN IS THE PLACE TO BE if you want to use the night as a cover for one on one hot romance.
SENATE LOVE GARDEN
This garden is located right within the premises of the Senate building of UNILAG and it is in the open unlike the education love garden. This place is very close to te lagoon front and as a result in the night, the atmosphere around the area is very cold. students dont normally fill this place when compared with the volume of trafic in education love garden, one major factor responsible for this is that the senate love garden is in the open which as a result dont allow for the kind of shows that is characterized with the education love garden. the kind of people that visit this area are those that have decided to take a walk up schoola nd as a result felt tired so they may decide to rest at the senate love garden, another factor is that the senate love garden always look like a gost arena in the night because students are afraid of the night therefore chosing to go to the education love garden instead.
Whether education love garden or senate love garden, everything that goes on around that area is strictly UNCENSORED.
COMPILED BY:
Tatafo
for unilag palava
LOVE MATTERS
MATTERS OF THE HEART
The following are the signs you should look out for in your partner when you want to decide whether he is abusive or not.
The following are the signs you should look out for in your partner when you want to decide whether he is abusive or not.
1. Watch out for every possesive and controlling guys. They are more likely to become abusive.
2. Monitor hisjealousy and insecurity levels. Does he dislike your friends for no apparent reason? 3. Be aware of violence or threats of violence. This is never an acceptable behaviour.
4. Dont get taken in by the way he cries and rationalises his behaviour. He will use your sympathy to get you. He may even tyr to manipulate you by making it seem like it's your fault.
5. Notice if he tries to remove you from public places inorder to get you abused.
6. See if he belittles you all the time. Does he ever call you names ? Hurtful names that you have repeated begged him not to call you ?
7. Watch how he talks to or about your parents or your friends. Is he rude or unkind ?
8.
9. Look for patterns of violence. People who are abusive in relationships are often abusive in other situations.
10. Has he ever shoved or hit you ? Has he ever thrown things at you? THIS IS THE MOST OBVIOUS SIGN OF AN ABUSER.
THINGS TO DO:
If you tell him that you do not tolerate his behaviour and he apologises one minute and then blames you the next, then he is not sincere. Its time to move on.
Sometimes, he will accuse you of not loving him,do not be fooled, this is a mere tactics to make you feel guilty and to stay with him. If you decide to leave him then you must do so and break all ties and communication with him. Its the only way you can successfully move on.
Try to let someone know of your situation so that they can help you,because in an abusive relationship, you need COURAGE,STRENGHT,POWER and DETERMINATION.
Comments are welcome from the readers, you can send your comments on any of our write-up to unilagpalava@gmail.com
Posted by unilagpalava
12.22.2009
STUDENT POLITICS: THE IMPLICATION FOR UNILAG
Now that UNILAG is gradually returning to her age long political life, it is important to share some tips on campus politics, the cost and the benefit to student and the university community.
The programme of the school authorities is that departmental associations will be allowed first and gradually the STUDENT UNION UNION proper will then be allowed if the departmental associations are of good conduct.
While all efforts are now geared towards the resuscitation of the departmental associations, actually the election to various departmental bodies are underway with various types of parties and students emerging to contest for all the various post available within each faculty.
THE COST
The cost for setting up and running a viable student associations is always borne by the students who pay annual compulsory subscription to fund the organization, however the cost of conducting the election is always borne by the student affairs department in the office of the DSA, the cost of campaign and posters are always incurred by the party or candidate interested in contesting for any elective post within the faculty or any level he / she is contesting for.
THE BENEFIT
The resuscitation of student unionism in any university creates an avenue for students with political thought to display their talents and most importantly, it prepares the students for life after campus especially the aspect of social interactions and human resource management, that is why the product of UI AND OBAFEMI AWOLOWO UNIVERSITY always stand out in any gathering they find themselves, the only exception as regards UNILAG is the number and frequency of social gatherings that takes place on a daily basis in UNILAG…..;probably that is the only single factor that enables a UNILAG student to fit into any kind of social gathering because that has been the kind of things they are exposed to on a daily basis, to them the swagger keeps moving, that is the swag is dynamic in nature and it is the responsibility of UNILAG to define any latest swag in Nigeria.
Obviously, student representatives are entitled to a monthly salary and other incentives apart from the respect attached to the post holder. Any student that is oppurtuned to represent his class or department or faculty has a better chance of getting employed ahead of others especially if that kind olf student is charismatic in nature,political parties are always on the look out for such exceptional students who can contribute to the advancement of their political objectives.
Holding a political post on campus prepares the student for future leadership roles
double click on the title of this write up to drop your comment
8.10.2009
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